

November 27, 2023

# Investment Strategy

# 2024 Market Outlook



**Brian G. Belski**  
Chief Investment Strategist  
BMO Capital Markets Corp.  
212-885-4151  
brian.belski@bmo.com

Nicholas Roccanova, CFA  
Head of US Strategy  
BMO Capital Markets Corp.  
212-885-4179  
nicholas.roccanova@bmo.com

Ryan Bohren, CFA  
Head of Canadian Strategy  
BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc.  
416-359-4993  
ryan.bohren@bmo.com

Sooyun Hong  
Head of Portfolio & Thematic Strategy  
BMO Capital Markets Corp.  
212-885-5117  
sooyun.hong@bmo.com

Lexi Wang, CFA  
Quantitative Analyst  
BMO Capital Markets Corp.  
404 825-9397  
lexi.wang@bmo.com

Dillon Suresh, CFA  
Investment Strategy Associate  
BMO Capital Markets Corp.  
416-728-5108  
dillon.suresh@bmo.com

00:02 ET~

This report was prepared in part by an analyst(s) employed by a Canadian affiliate, BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., and who is (are) not registered as a research analyst(s) under FINRA rules. For disclosure statements, including the Analyst Certification, please refer to page(s) 32 to 35.

## Table of Contents

---

<b>2024 Market Outlook – US.....</b>	<b>3 – 14</b>
<b>US Sector Recommendations .....</b>	<b>15 – 17</b>
<b>US Style and Size Strategy .....</b>	<b>18 – 20</b>
<b>2024 Market Outlook – Canada.....</b>	<b>21 – 25</b>
<b>Canadian Sector Recommendations .....</b>	<b>26 – 29</b>
<b>Canadian Size and Style Strategy .....</b>	<b>30</b>



## 2024 Market Outlook

### Normal for Longer

The final sentence of the opening “prologue” from our 2023 Market Outlook said the following: *“Buckle up – the road to normalcy is fraught with truth and reality – and that is a very good thing.”* Indeed, US stock market performance and fundamentals in 2023 followed the script in our view to lay the foundation for what we continue to believe will be a path of normalcy for earnings growth, valuation trends, and price performance that is likely to unfold over the next three to five years. In other words, “normal for longer”; and yes, this is a play on words from what we view as one of the most overused phrases in 2023 (e.g., higher for longer). As such, we believe US stocks will attain another year of positive returns in 2024, albeit while demonstrating more sanguine, broadly distributed, and fundamentally defined performance relative to the last decade or so. In other words, *normal and typical*.

### The “Yeah-but Bears” Not Going Away Anytime Soon

Unfortunately, the “yeah-but bears” will likely continue to morph their narrative to fit their cause. As investment strategists, our job is to invest – *period*. To be sure, the humility of being wrong when the market posts negative returns (e.g., 2022 and 2018) has actually “helped us” see the forest through the ever increasingly noisy and windblown trees that are rampant with negativity and doubt like no other time in our career. What has transpired in our society, let alone the world of investing has been anything but typical into and out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Which generates a very common-sense query in our minds – why does the bearish narrative continue to rely so heavily on formulaic, quantitative, backward-looking macro and academic postures? The simple answer is their incessant need to make “market calls only” and prove that the market is wrong when it is exhibiting positive performance. Unfortunately, bearish fear sells, and bulls are routinely doubted and panned. So, get ready for another year of analysis paralysis of US Federal Reserve policy, the impacts of the “unflattening of the yield curve (instead of saying ‘steepening’), unemployment drifting higher, and of course the “Chicken Little recession” and its market impact that has been apparently just around the corner for the past few years and counting due to the lag effects of higher inflation and interest rates (a lag effect that mysteriously keeps getting pushed out – the epitome of the “yeah-but bears”). Yes, at some point any or all these data points and other negative/unhealthy facts will transpire – but not when every bear and doubter is waiting, forecasting, and relying on the inevitability of their actual occurrence and the inherent goal of being able to say, “I told you so”. For our part, we prefer to stay in our lane and invest.

### Transitioning From the All or None and Toward the Norm Will Take Time

Believe it or not, we are aligned with the naysayers on one very important topic – *typical versus atypical*. Liquidity-induced performance and 0% interest rates are not typical. All-or-none investing – e.g., all large cap + no small cap; all Technology + no Financials; all growth + no value; all stocks + no bonds; all momentum + no fundamentals have clouded and defined the investing landscape for most of the past 15 years, in our view. But that does not make it normal or typical. To the contrary, it is normal for good news to be good news and market performance to be dictated and defined by fundamental and company-specific analysis. Those investors that remain fixated on making market calls and basing individual investment decisions on market multiples and GDP, for instance, are likely in for more pain than gain in our view. After all, the stock market is market of stocks – stocks that are companies – and companies that have products, services, a track record of results that are led by management teams. In other words, good old-fashioned stock picking is likely to be rewarded – not a macro or quant screen that must equate to X or some pre-conceived conclusion that tells you when to buy or sell. To reiterate, we believe 2024 will be Year 2 of at least a 3-5 year process that will see US stocks exhibit more normal and typical performance, paced by a backdrop of normal and typical GDP and earnings growth, valuation, and bond yield ranges. Call it goldilocks, nirvana; label it what you will. But an outlook for high-single to low double-digit market performance is far from a “perma-bull” moniker. We prefer, a common sense and yes more humble approach to investing versus trying to prove that our narrative is always correct.

## **S&P 2024 Year-End Target Models**

### **S&P 500 Price Target 5,100**

Unlike last year, we are once again enthusiastic about stock market potential heading into 2024. As we have contended all year, we continue to believe that US stocks are in a bull market that has now entered its second year. And while there is a growing possibility that the S&P 500 continues to grind higher in the coming weeks to finish above our 2023 year-end price target of 4,550, we believe it will be difficult for the market to replicate similar gains in 2024 given historical bull market performance patterns that suggest lower, but still solid gains, with our new target implying 11.9% from the latest levels. We also believe that volatility is likely to subside as macro-environment resiliency continues to surprise alongside falling inflation, but we still expect there to be bumps along the way as investors continue to grapple with market expectations and Fed messaging. In addition, underlying leadership patterns are likely to be very different next year, with significantly more participation coming from non-mega-cap stocks. Finally, there has been a lot of debate about the probability of a US recession next year, but that is a discussion we will leave for the economists. But if one does occur, we would borrow an acronym from the political lexicon to describe its likely severity – RINO or recession in name only since labor market data continues to remain remarkably resilient and employment levels are what almost always determine how good or bad things get in the economy from our perspective. So, we will continue to take our cue from labor market trends and unless they take a sharp turn for the worse, we are simply not concerned about the recession debate at this point.

So, what does this mean from an investment perspective? In a simple sense, we believe investors will need to own a little bit of “everything” and not tilt too far in one direction or another from a sector, style, and size perspective – a sharp contrast to the trends that prevailed during 2023. However, this should not be interpreted as a recommendation to be more passive when making decisions – to the contrary, we believe active investment strategies will be even more important next year as many of the largest stocks that drove performance within sectors are unlikely to maintain that momentum in 2024, forcing investors to search for other opportunities further down the market cap spectrum.

### **S&P 500 EPS Target \$250**

Similarly, we are anticipating a significant rebound in S&P 500 earnings next year with our new target implying a growth rate of roughly 13.6% from both our current 2023 year-end EPS target and bottom-up consensus estimate of \$220. Yes, this may seem aggressive given that the consensus economic forecast is calling for little GDP growth during 2024. But similar forecasts were being made last year and companies proved they were more than capable of delivering in a challenging macro environment in 2023 with the S&P 500 delivering its highest aggregate surprise levels in over 10 years (excluding the pandemic). Therefore, even if surprise levels normalize next year (5% historical average), we believe EPS of \$250 is reasonably attainable given that the current 2024 bottom-up number is roughly \$245 and the next year estimate has typically declined about 3.9% in the year following. As such, unlike last year, we expect the P/E multiple to remain relatively static, with gains being driven primarily through earnings growth next year.

**Exhibit 1: 2024 S&P 500 Target Model Scenarios**

Scenario	Price	EPS	Rationale
Bull	5,500	\$260	US economy defies the vaunted yield curve indicator and avoids recession, inflation declines more rapidly than expected throughout the whole year, 10yr yield slowly declines throughout the entire year getting closer to 3%. This leads to better multiple expansion and earnings growth to deliver an above-average calendar year gain.
Base	5,100	\$250	US recession in name only is the foundation as labor market remains resilient; Fed remains on pause in 1H with rate cuts commencing later in year; 10yr yield is range-bound just over 4% for the first half, then declines in 2H as inflation gets closer to Fed target. Earnings growth picks up the slack for market returns with a more normal calendar year return.
Bear	4,100	\$230	Economy has something more than a mild recession; Fed underestimated the lagged effects of its policy; unemployment starts to accelerate, risk off comes back in full force (investors and companies), earnings growth stalls as multiples compress. Good news is interest rates and inflation probably accelerate to the downside. Bad news is this will probably lead to sizeable calendar year decline

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group.

**Exhibit 2: 2023 & 2024 S&P 500 Targets**

Price Target			
Model	Category	2023E	2024E
Dividend Discount Model	Fundamental	4,750	5,175
Fair Value Price-to-Earnings Model	Valuation	4,350	5,050
Expected Return*		0%	11.9%
Latest S&P 500 Close		4,556	
<b>Price Target</b>		<b>4,550</b>	<b>5,100</b>
Earnings Per Share Target			
Model	Category		
Macroeconomic Regression Model	Macro	\$215	\$240
Bottom Up Mean Consensus Expectation	Fundamental	\$220	\$245
Normalized EPS	Mean Reversion	\$200	\$205
Expected EPS Growth		0.5%	13.6%
Prior Year S&P 500 EPS**		\$219	\$220
<b>EPS Target</b>		<b>\$220</b>	<b>\$250</b>
<b>Implied P/E</b>		<b>20.7x</b>	<b>20.4x</b>

\*Based on 11/22/2023 closing price.


\*\*Based on our prior-year EPS target if EPS is not fully reported for index.

Source: BMO Investment Strategy Group.

### This Is a Bull Market That Is Entering Its Second Year


The S&P 500 closed more than 20% above its 10/12/22 bear market price low on June 8, a feat commonly accepted to mark the start of a new bull market. For our part, we have been adamant in our belief for quite some time that the 2022 mid-October low represented the end of the bear market and that a new bull market has commenced, and historical data appears to support our case. For instance, once the overall market has climbed 20% above its previous price low, that low signaled the start of a new bull market in all but one of the prior 14 instances (Exhibit 3). The exception came during the early 2000s when the market was unwinding from the collapse of the tech bubble and the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks – periods that do not resemble the current market environment, in our view. In fact, the S&P 500 has gained an average of 23% in the 18 months following the 20% threshold (Exhibit 4), which in the current context would roughly represent 2024 year-end. For reference, the S&P 500 closed at 4,294 on June 8 and applying the average 18-month gain would imply an index level of roughly 5,280. In other words, we believe this is and continues to be a bull market now entering its second year.

**Exhibit 3: S&P 500 Is Now Roughly 27% Higher Than Bear Market Low**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 4: 20% Moves Off Price Lows Almost Always = a Bull Market**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

### Expect Lower, but Still Solid Gains for Year Two of the Bull


Our work shows that the S&P 500 has historically gained an average of 11.1% during year two of bull markets, much smaller than the 38.3% average gain seen in year one, but still a double-digit return, nonetheless (Exhibit 5). In fact, the 12/4/1987 to 7/16/1990 bull market was the only one going back to 1945 where the second year outpaced the first year in terms of performance (29.3% vs. 21.4%). Our work also shows that price returns tend to be notably less volatile during the second year of bull markets with the percentage of outsized daily price changes (+/- 1%) for the S&P 500 roughly 42% lower in year two versus year one (Exhibit 6). And despite history pointing to lower volatility in the months ahead, we still believe there will likely be some choppiness along the way as the believability of the bull market continues to get questioned. As Exhibit 7 shows, the S&P 500 has still averaged a roughly 10% max drawdown in the second year of bull markets, suggesting that investors should remain active and disciplined when it comes to their investment process rather than being passive or reactive to shorter-term performance trends. Finally, there is one characteristic we expect to improve dramatically in the upcoming year – the percentage of stocks outperforming the index. As Exhibit 8 shows, participation levels were considerably below-average during the bull market’s first year, something we view as abnormal and likely to revert to the historical norm next year.

**Exhibit 5: Stocks Log Lower Gains in Second Year of Bull Markets**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 6: Big Moves Less Common in Second Year of Bull Markets**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 7: Corrections Are Inevitable for All Parts of Bull Markets**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 8: Leadership Trends Likely to Revert to Historical Norms**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.


## Earnings Trends Have Remained Resilient Despite Perceived Challenges

The trajectory of US stock earnings has been a very popular and highly debatable topic based on our client conversations. For much of the year, many believed that the combination of high inflation and rising interest rates would lead to a significant deterioration of earnings growth due to the pressure that both were perceived to have on profit margins. We have disagreed with this notion all along and the data appears to support our view that earnings pessimism has been and continues to be overstated. First, we never bought into the profit margin worry because US stocks entered the year in a position of strength, with margins at historically high levels. So, our take was there would be more than enough cushion for stocks to absorb some deterioration without collapsing earnings. Indeed, as Exhibits 9-10 show, trends have unfolded as we expected. For instance, while EBIT and net margins are certainly




lower, they remain well above-average. In addition, EPS levels have been quite resilient with trailing numbers essentially stable for most of 2023, while forward expectations have rebounded in recent months. Second, revision trends appear to support a more positive backdrop. According to our work, revisions and earnings growth have exhibited a strong positive relationship historically, with the former typically leading the latter by several months (Exhibit 11). Therefore, we expect the recent uptick in revisions to translate into improved earnings growth in the coming months.

**Exhibit 9: Margins Have Not Collapsed Despite Macro Pressures**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.


**Exhibit 10: EPS Has Been Stable While Expectations Have Improved**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 11: Revisions Breadth Has Recovered, Which Should Be Positive for Earnings Growth**

**S&P 500 Revisions Composite and Blended EPS Growth**  
 % of upward to total FY1 & FY2 EPS revision in prior 60 days; blended growth: average of LTM & NTM




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

## Higher Interest Rates Are Not Necessarily a Roadblock


The 10-year US Treasury yield has remained consistently above 4% in recent months with levels at one point almost breaching 5%, a level not seen in more than 15 years (Exhibit 12). And given what is likely to be a higher-for-longer interest rate backdrop, yields are likely to remain much higher when compared to recent years for the foreseeable future, a scenario that continues to worry many investors as it relates to US stock market performance. However, our work shows that US stocks can perform quite well in a higher interest rate environment, despite perceptions to the contrary. For instance, we analyzed rolling one-year monthly periods since 1979 and calculated S&P 500 performance under various rate scenarios (Exhibit 13). While we found that US stocks have performed better when the US 10-year Treasury yield was below its three-year moving average, gaining an average of 10.6%, the S&P 500 has still registered a solid average gain of 8.7% when yields were above-average. Similarly, when the yield was rising and above average, the S&P 500 still managed a respectable 8.3% average gain. More important, should yields begin to decline from current levels our analysis suggests that the market can deliver a double-digit gain even if yields remain above average.

**Exhibit 12: US 10Y Treasury Yield Has Broken Firmly Above Its 3Yr Moving Average Yield This Year**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FRB.

**Exhibit 13: Above-Average Yields Are Not Necessarily a Stock Market Hinderance, Regardless of Direction**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FRB.

## Labor Market Strength and Consumption Trends Support a Soft-Landing Scenario

Entering 2023, the biggest worry was that the Fed was underestimating its tightening campaign and that the cumulative effect would lead the economy into a severe recession. Well, after 5¼ ppts of rate hikes it has become increasingly clear that the worst-case scenario has not materialized. In fact, inflation has continued to decelerate at a faster-than-expected rate, while the labor market and consumption trends have remained remarkably resilient despite some bumps along the way (Exhibits 14-16). Therefore, unless trends in these indicators take a significant turn for the worse in the coming months, we believe at a minimum that any sort of recession that may occur is likely to be a very shallow one or maybe the fabled soft-landing scenario (no recession) is becoming increasingly more believable.


**Exhibit 14: Inflation Has Steadily Declined While Labor Market Strength Has Remained Resilient**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, BLS, DOL.

**Exhibit 15: Jobless Claims Remain Well Below Average**


Initial Jobless Claims  
SA, thousands



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, DOL.

**Exhibit 16: Consumption Trends Have Improved Lately**

Personal Consumption Expenditures  
SAAR, Chained 2012 \$




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, BEA.

### Presidential Election Year Performance


With the Presidential election slated for 2024, there has been a lot of discussion about how US stocks tend to have more muted gains relative to historical averages during election years. While this is certainly true – the S&P 500 returns an average of 6.8% during all election years from 1950 compared to an average of 9.1% for all years – we believe the data deserve a closer inspection. For instance, 2024 represents a re-election year for President Biden and we found that S&P 500 calendar year performance during re-election years has tended to be much better than average, gaining 12.1% (Exhibit 17). However, performance trends during the first half of the year tend to resemble all election years before jumping sharply during the second half of the year. In addition, market performance has been significantly better, on average, when a Democratic President is seeking re-election, with a full-year gain of 16.8% (Exhibit 18). Therefore, we believe the election and its potential market impact is being over-generalized since historical trends within the current context actually argue for above-average gains.

**Exhibit 17: Presidential Election Years Tend to Have Lower Average Market Performance, but Re-Election Years Are Much Better**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, Bloomberg.

**Exhibit 18: Market Performance Is Significantly Above Average When a Democratic President Is Seeking Re-Election**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, Bloomberg.


### Path of Secular Bull Remains on Track as It Progresses Further Into Its Second Half

The Fed’s tightening campaign over the past 18+ months has been nearly unprecedented in its rapidity and especially when compared to previous policy actions during the past 30 years. The bear market of 2022 was a direct response to the uncertainty surrounding what higher rates would mean for the economy and stocks going forward, in our view, and that negativity hung around for a good part of 2023 as well. For our part, we did not let the inflow of volatility and uncertainty deter us from our 20-year secular bull market stance for US stocks, a prediction that we originally made back in 2010. Instead, we opted to take a wait-and-see-approach to the historic rate hikes and take our cues from the data – and lo and behold, all those worst-case scenario forecasts never came to fruition. In fact, economic data (specifically employment) and corporate earnings have remained remarkably resilient, while inflation has subsided and is getting closer to the Fed’s target. Thus, we continue to believe that October 12, 2022 marked the end of another cyclical bear market and the resumption of the secular bull market with trends to date very similar to those of the previous two secular cycles (Exhibit 19). With that said, it is important to remind investors that periods of declines and volatility will inevitably occur again just as they have in the past, but these periods will not necessarily derail the secular bull, in our view.

Longer-term performance trends, in the form of ten-year annualized holding period price returns, have stabilized in recent months after the bear market of 2022 dented performance (Exhibit 20). Nonetheless, the level has yet to dip below the rolling one-year average (i.e., historical annualized average), a level the market first exceeded in 2018 for this secular bull. In fact, the recent trend does not look too dissimilar from the paths of the previous two secular cycles where the ten-year annualized returns peaked somewhere around the halfway point, fell near the one-year average return level for a few years, but then managed to maintain those levels throughout the conclusions of both.


While there is certainly no perfect historical comparison that can be used to lay out the road map for stocks in the future, we are confident that the secular bull market can continue to roll on, especially given the current fundamental states of US stocks and the economy.

**Exhibit 19: The Secular Bull Market Has Been Reignited**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 20: Longer-Term Returns Have Stabilized**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**“Smaller” Is Likely to Be a Key 2024 Theme**

It is no secret that 2023 S&P 500 gains have been primarily driven by a handful of mega-cap stocks. In fact, an analysis of the 10 largest S&P 500 stocks compared to the remaining stocks within the index show that relative performance is on pace to be one of the best years ever for this subset. For instance, the relative year-over-year price change recently hit 38%, which represents the 99<sup>th</sup> percentile of all trailing one-year relative returns since 1990. In addition, the recent strength has pushed the relative price to a historical high (Exhibit 21). Furthermore, 2023 YTD relative performance of roughly 51% is on track to be the best year in over three decades and more than 20% higher than the second-best year, which occurred in 1999 when these stocks outperformed the remaining ones by 34% (Exhibit 22). Therefore, we believe it is highly unlikely that these trends can continue into 2024 and expect the rest of the index to perform significantly better on a relative basis next year. And while some investors may be concerned that the market is likely to struggle without these stocks leading the way, our analysis shows that the S&P 500 has performed just fine following peaks in relative performance of the 10 largest stocks. As Exhibit 23 shows, the S&P 500 has averaged a 14.3% return in the year following prior relative performance peaks since 1990. In fact, the only period where the index posted a loss occurred in 2001, and as we mentioned previously, we do not consider that to be a comparable period.

**Exhibit 21: The Largest S&P 500 Stocks Have Driven Performance**


**Relative Price and Performance of Largest 10 S&P 500 Stocks vs. Remaining Stocks**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, Bloomberg.

**Exhibit 22: 2023 Is on Track to Be Best Year Ever for Largest Stocks**


**Relative Price Change By Year of Largest 10 S&P 500 Stocks vs. Remaining Stocks**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 23: S&P 500 Can Perform When Large Stock Leadership Fades**


**S&P 500 Subsequent 1Yr Performance Following Peaks in Y/Y Realive Performance of 10 Largest S&P 500 Stocks**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.


The fundamental backdrop is another reason that we expect the rest of the index to begin performing better in the coming year. Valuation for the 10 largest S&P 500 stocks is quite stretched relative to historical norms. For instance, the NTM P/E of these stocks is roughly 25.4x now, which represents more than a 33% premium to its longer-term average (Exhibit 24). By contrast, the rest of the index has an NTM P/E of 15.4x, which represents a slight discount to its longer-term average (Exhibit 25). In addition, NTM EPS growth for the 10 largest has certainly improved significantly over the past few months and probably partly responsible for the impressive performance, but similar levels have typically represented peaks in growth historically (Exhibit 26). On the other hand, NTM EPS growth for the rest of the index bottomed earlier in 2023 and has been improving ever since (Exhibit 27). Thus, we believe reasonable valuation and a recovering earnings backdrop strongly favors these stocks and would recommend that investors position portfolios accordingly.

**Exhibit 24: Largest S&P 500 Stocks Trade at a Substantial Premium**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 25: Rest of Index Trades at a Slight Discount**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 26: Earnings Growth of Largest Stocks May Be Peaking**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 27: Earnings Growth for Rest of Index Is in Recovery Mode**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

## Sectors, Size, and Style Recommendations

### US Sector Opinions

**Exhibit 28: US Sector Opinion Summary**

Sector	Opinion	Index Weight	Target Weight	BMO Investment Strategy Group Headline
Communication Services	MW	8.9	9	Paced sector performance for most of 2023, time to book some gains; neutralize growth and value positions
Consumer Discretionary	MW	10.7	11	Tough to OW when two stocks comprise 50% of sector; cannot UW and bet against the consumer; be selective
Consumer Staples	UW	6.3	5.5	Remains a defensive favorite despite underperformance last 12-months; growth remains lackluster
Energy	UW	4.1	3.5	Massively underperformed underlying commodity last 12 months; stay with the integrated names only
Financials	OW	12.8	13.5	More hated now than 2009; the best value proposition in US stocks by a long shot; focus on scale
Health Care	MW	12.6	12.5	COVID-19 overhang hurting pharma; focus on value names with steady cash flow, dividends, and stable earnings
Industrials	MW	8.3	8.5	Quintessential stock pickers sector; lack of dominant name in sector makes bottom up opinions more vital
Information Technology	OW	29.1	30	Not just about The Magnificent 7 – own the core “Consumer Staples Tech” and sharpen selectivity
Materials	UW	2.4	1.5	Lagging underlying commodities in most cases; akin to Energy, will falter if global growth slows
Real Estate	MW	2.4	2.5	Contrarian play, as Real Estate fears are very consensus; focus on consistent payouts
Utilities	MW	2.4	2.5	Very oversold; multiples have come back to reality, but debt to equity remains elevated; own dividend growth

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group; Key: OW: Overweight, MW: Market Weight, UW: Underweight

**Exhibit 29: S&P 500 Annual Sector Performance**

Year	COMSV	COND	CONS	ENRS	FINL	HLTH	INDU	INFT	MATR	RELS	UTIL	SPX
1990	-17.7%	-14.9%	12.4%	-1.4%	-42.1%	14.1%	-10.2%	0.3%	-13.9%		-7.3%	-6.6%
1991	7.9%	38.3%	38.4%	2.4%	43.8%	50.2%	26.0%	6.6%	21.5%		16.0%	26.3%
1992	11.0%	17.5%	3.0%	-2.3%	19.8%	-18.1%	6.8%	0.6%	7.2%		0.3%	4.5%
1993	10.8%	12.8%	-6.3%	11.2%	7.8%	-11.0%	15.8%	20.5%	10.5%		7.8%	7.1%
1994	-8.4%	-9.9%	6.8%	-0.4%	-6.4%	10.2%	-4.8%	19.1%	3.3%		-17.2%	-1.5%
1995	37.3%	18.2%	36.2%	26.0%	49.6%	54.5%	35.9%	38.8%	17.3%		25.2%	34.1%
1996	-2.2%	10.5%	23.2%	21.7%	31.9%	18.8%	22.7%	43.3%	13.4%		0.2%	20.3%
1997	37.1%	32.3%	30.5%	22.0%	45.4%	41.7%	25.0%	28.1%	6.3%		18.4%	31.0%
1998	49.3%	39.6%	13.9%	-2.0%	9.6%	42.3%	9.3%	77.6%	-8.0%		10.0%	26.7%
1999	17.4%	24.1%	-16.6%	16.0%	2.3%	-11.6%	19.9%	78.4%	23.0%		-12.8%	19.5%
2000	-39.7%	-20.7%	14.5%	13.2%	23.4%	35.5%	4.5%	-41.0%	-17.7%		51.7%	-10.1%
2001	-13.7%	1.9%	-8.3%	-12.3%	-10.5%	-12.9%	-7.0%	-26.0%	1.0%		-32.5%	-13.0%
2002	-35.9%	-24.4%	-6.3%	-13.3%	-16.4%	-20.0%	-27.6%	-37.6%	-7.7%	-15.1%	-33.0%	-23.4%
2003	3.3%	36.1%	9.2%	22.4%	27.9%	13.3%	29.7%	46.5%	34.8%	20.8%	21.1%	26.4%
2004	16.0%	12.1%	6.0%	28.8%	8.2%	0.2%	16.0%	2.1%	10.8%	21.9%	19.6%	9.0%
2005	-9.0%	-7.4%	1.3%	29.1%	3.7%	4.9%	0.4%	0.4%	2.2%	7.4%	12.8%	3.0%
2006	32.1%	17.2%	11.8%	22.2%	16.2%	5.8%	11.0%	7.7%	15.7%	36.8%	16.9%	13.6%
2007	8.5%	-14.3%	11.6%	32.4%	-20.8%	5.4%	9.8%	15.5%	20.0%	-20.5%	15.8%	3.5%
2008	-33.6%	-34.7%	-17.7%	-35.9%	-56.9%	-24.5%	-41.5%	-43.7%	-47.0%	-45.0%	-31.5%	-38.5%
2009	2.6%	38.8%	11.2%	11.3%	14.8%	17.1%	17.3%	59.9%	45.2%	20.8%	6.8%	23.5%
2010	12.3%	25.7%	10.7%	17.9%	10.8%	0.7%	23.9%	9.1%	19.9%	28.0%	0.9%	12.8%
2011	0.8%	4.4%	10.5%	2.8%	-18.4%	10.2%	-2.9%	1.3%	-11.6%	7.9%	14.8%	0.0%
2012	12.5%	21.9%	7.5%	2.3%	26.3%	15.2%	12.5%	13.1%	12.2%	16.2%	-2.9%	13.4%
2013	6.5%	41.0%	22.7%	22.3%	33.2%	38.7%	37.6%	26.2%	22.7%	-1.5%	8.8%	29.6%
2014	-1.9%	8.0%	12.9%	-10.0%	13.1%	23.3%	7.5%	18.2%	4.7%	26.1%	24.3%	11.4%
2015	-1.7%	8.4%	3.8%	-23.6%	-3.5%	5.2%	-4.7%	4.3%	-10.4%	1.2%	-8.4%	-0.7%
2016	17.8%	4.3%	2.6%	23.7%	20.1%	-4.4%	16.1%	12.0%	14.1%	0.0%	12.2%	9.5%
2017	-6.0%	21.2%	10.5%	-3.8%	20.0%	20.0%	18.5%	36.9%	21.4%	7.2%	8.3%	19.4%
2018	-16.4%	-0.5%	-11.2%	-20.5%	-14.7%	4.7%	-15.0%	-1.6%	-16.4%	-5.6%	0.5%	-6.2%
2019	30.9%	26.2%	24.0%	7.6%	29.2%	18.7%	26.8%	48.0%	21.9%	24.9%	22.2%	28.9%
2020	22.2%	32.1%	7.6%	-37.3%	-4.1%	11.4%	9.0%	42.2%	18.1%	-5.2%	-2.8%	16.3%
2021	20.5%	23.7%	15.6%	47.7%	32.5%	24.2%	19.4%	33.4%	25.0%	42.5%	14.0%	26.9%
2022	-40.4%	-37.6%	-3.2%	59.0%	-12.4%	-3.6%	-7.1%	-28.9%	-14.1%	-28.4%	-1.4%	-19.4%
2023	51.7%	32.5%	-5.0%	-4.5%	2.7%	-4.3%	7.7%	50.9%	3.8%	-2.5%	-12.0%	18.7%

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group. Performance calculated through 11/22/23. REITs are used as a historical proxy for the Real Estate sector, which was officially established in Sept. 2016.



## US Sectors

### Overview = Own the Winners (Tech for Growth) and Be Contrarian (Financials for Value)


Welcome to everything in moderation. To be clear, having two sectors out of eleven as overweight positions heading into 2024 might not be considered an exciting allocation. However, as performance broadens out, we believe sector calls will become less important relative to bottom-up stock picking. In fact, for most of 2023, disparity with respect to price performance, earnings growth, and valuation has been steadily increasing within most sectors according to our work. Furthermore, when the three most important secular growth sectors in our view (Technology, Discretionary, and Communication Services) are unilaterally dominated in terms of performance by one or two stocks, the likelihood of that domination should “normalize”. This is not to say those stocks/sectors will underperform – to the contrary. Given our view of each sector’s secular fundamental prowess, we believe other constituents and industries will “pick up the slack”. We believe this favors Technology over both Communication Services and Discretionary considering the relative and absolute size of the sector, number of companies, diversification, and most importantly, impressive cash flow, dividend growth, and earnings stability. For Financials – everyone’s favorite sector to hate – we believe the sector is primed for a massive contrarian reversal. First off, most institutional investors are very underexposed and have been overemphasizing the negative “what ifs” – including, but not limited to, credit blowing up, real estate melting down, expansive loan losses, and unmanageable consumer debt. None of these have materialized to date. As such, we continue to believe the theme of owning scale within Financials remains key, thereby benefitting money center banks, brokerages, and asset managers. We also believe stabilizing bond yields over the next few years will only help regional banks (M&A remains a major theme, to combat competition with money center banks) as well as select private equity companies.

## Sector Changes

### Upgrading Utilities to Market Weight From Underweight

- As strategists, we have admittedly been reluctant to favor Utilities for most of our career. Our reasoning has mostly been defined by our concerns regarding the sector’s traditional premium, if not downright expensive valuation metrics, decelerating cash flow, and inhibiting debt to equity ratios that have been commonplace for Utilities for most of the past 20 years.
- However, thanks to one of the sharpest pullbacks in price and valuation in decades, Utilities are no longer expensive according to our models. Furthermore, the sector is likely to benefit from stabilizing, if not likely compressed bond yields in 2024.

### Exhibit 30: Relative Valuation and Performance Trends Suggest a Turnaround for Utilities



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

### Downgrading Communication Services to Market Weight From Overweight

- While we continue to believe Communication Services is a secular growth leader along with Technology and parts of Consumer Discretionary, we are choosing to “book our gain.” Most investors have quickly forgotten that the sector was universally disliked heading into 2023, only to benefit from the tax-loss selling reversal that essentially kicked off the Magnificent 7 run during the first half of 2024.
- We would advise investors to neutralize the barbell within the sector by adding more exposure to the yield, value, and contrarian areas within the sector relative to the higher-octane mega caps.

**Exhibit 31: Communication Services Barbell Fundamental Snapshot**

Ticker	Company	YTD Price Change	NTM P/E	2024E EPS Growth	Dividend Yield
<b>Growth Stocks</b>					
GOOGL	Alphabet Inc. Class A	53.4%	20.4	16.6%	0%
META	Meta Platforms Inc. Class A	178.4%	19.5	21.3%	0%
NFLX	Netflix, Inc.	58.0%	30.0	30.6%	0%
<b>Average:</b>		<b>96.6%</b>	<b>23.3</b>	<b>22.8%</b>	<b>0%</b>
<b>Value Stocks</b>					
T	AT&T Inc.	-13.6%	6.4	3.0%	7.0%
VZ	Verizon Communications Inc.	-8.0%	7.8	-1.7%	7.3%
CMCSA	Comcast Corporation Class A	21.3%	10.0	9.3%	2.7%
DIS	Walt Disney Company	8.4%	20.1	19.9%	0.0%
<b>Average:</b>		<b>2.0%</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>4.3%</b>

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.


### Downgrading Energy and Materials to Underweight From Market Weight

- Both sectors displayed disappointing performance in 2023 as oil and commodity prices slid throughout the year. As such, we believe both sectors will likely remain under pressure in 2024 as consensus forecasts are for lower inflation and slower global growth, which should lead to continued deceleration in underlying commodity prices, in our view.
- Focus on integrated oil companies with steady dividend yields within Energy and paper/forest products and gold in Materials.

**Exhibit 32: Lower Expected Inflation Is a Big Challenge for Energy**


**Exhibit 33: Lower Commodity Prices Likely to Weigh on Materials**

**Energy Relative Performance and CPI**  
% change year-over-year



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, BLS.

**Materials Relative Performance and Commodity Prices**  
% change year-over-year



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, CRB.

## US Size and Style – ELE – Everybody Love Everybody

### Exhibit 34: US Size and Style Opinions

Sector	Opinion	Comments
Large cap (LC)	MW	Outsized move in 2023 is likely precursor to broader participation in 2024; maintain exposure to stability; add risk down cap
Mid cap (MC)	MW	Massive discount to large cap in terms of valuation; earnings more mixed relative to small, but operating performance solid
Small cap (SC)	MW	Valuation at all-time lows relative to large and mid; earnings are improving faster than mid; slight tilt over mid cap
Value	MW	Traditional value sectors should drive performance, barbells within Comm Services and Health Care will also bolster
Growth	MW	Perception of lower bond yields, let alone stabilization will maintain the Growth bid; focus on steady earnings and cash flow

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group; Key: OW: Overweight, MW: Market Weight, UW: Underweight

### Exhibit 35: S&P 500 Style and Size Annual Performance

Year	SPX	SGX	SVX	MID	SML
1995	34.1%	35.6%	32.5%	28.6%	28.6%
1996	20.3%	21.9%	18.7%	17.3%	20.1%
1997	31.0%	34.7%	27.1%	30.4%	24.5%
1998	26.7%	40.6%	12.5%	17.7%	-2.1%
1999	19.5%	27.3%	10.7%	13.3%	11.5%
2000	-10.1%	-22.5%	4.2%	16.2%	11.0%
2001	-13.0%	-13.5%	-13.2%	-1.6%	5.7%
2002	-23.4%	-24.5%	-22.5%	-15.4%	-15.3%
2003	26.4%	23.9%	29.0%	34.0%	37.5%
2004	9.0%	4.7%	13.3%	15.2%	21.6%
2005	3.0%	2.5%	3.5%	11.3%	6.7%
2006	13.6%	9.4%	18.0%	9.0%	14.1%
2007	3.5%	7.7%	-0.4%	6.7%	-1.2%
2008	-38.5%	-35.9%	-41.2%	-37.3%	-32.0%
2009	23.5%	29.3%	17.4%	35.0%	23.8%
2010	12.8%	13.2%	12.4%	24.9%	25.0%
2011	0.0%	2.8%	-2.9%	-3.1%	-0.2%
2012	13.4%	12.4%	14.7%	16.1%	14.8%
2013	29.6%	30.4%	28.8%	31.6%	39.7%
2014	11.4%	13.0%	9.6%	8.2%	4.4%
2015	-0.7%	3.8%	-5.6%	-3.7%	-3.4%
2016	9.5%	5.1%	14.3%	18.7%	24.7%
2017	19.4%	25.4%	12.6%	14.5%	11.7%
2018	-6.2%	-1.4%	-11.3%	-12.5%	-9.8%
2019	28.9%	29.1%	28.6%	24.1%	20.9%
2020	16.3%	32.0%	-1.4%	11.8%	9.6%
2021	26.9%	31.0%	22.2%	23.2%	25.3%
2022	-19.4%	-30.1%	-7.4%	-14.5%	-17.4%
2023	18.7%	24.1%	12.7%	4.9%	0.9%

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group. Performance calculated through 11/22/23.


### Value and Growth Coexisting

Following our broader theme of normalization and moderation, we believe US value and growth stocks are heading into “coexist mode”. Gone are the days of massive multi-year periods of outperformance of growth over value. While we continue to focus less on the actual growth and value indices and more on the underlying stocks, it is important to note that the S&P Value Index has only outperformed in three calendar years since the GFC. Growth has clearly carried the mantle of momentum and performance during the QE era, but is likely to give way (not underperform, but share) performance with Value going forward.

- **Value Playbook:** Dividend growth massively underperformed in 2023, mostly due to Financials, but also the impact of higher bond yields on Utilities and REITs and other traditional ultra-defensive areas. Thanks to declining and/or stabilizing bond yields, this trend should reverse as 2024 unfolds. Therefore, value investors should invest accordingly and overweight positions that exhibit traditional dividend growth attributes as well as GARP (growth at a reasonable price) and YARP (yield at a reasonable price) characteristics.
- **Growth Playbook:** We believe there is a very good chance that the “Magnificent 7” will not be as unified in terms of performance trends in 2024. For instance, company-specific fundamentals are very different, with recent price performance trends in the 4Q portending to increasingly varied performance in 2024. This likely opens the door for increased participation with traditional growth areas (especially within Technology), a trend that would be very healthy in our view. Given the outperformance of growth, we believe investors should be much more prudent and focus on themes (not just liquidity or momentum), stable growth, and even dividends within Growth sectors.

**Exhibit 36: Style Cycles Tend to Be Long-Lasting, Indicating That Recent Value Shift May Be Here to Stay**


**Rolling 3Y Annualized Price Return Difference: Russell 1000 Value vs Growth**  
monthly data; above 0: Value outperforms; below 0: Growth outperforms



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, Russell.

**Exhibit 37: Value Offering Reasonable Valuation With Stronger Growth**


**Relative Blended P/E and Earnings Growth: Value vs Growth**  
SPX Value and Growth indices; blended P/E & EPS growth: avg of LTM & NTM



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 38: Value Tends to Outperform Following End of Rate Hikes**

**Average Russell 1000 Style Index Price Performance Following End of Fed Tightening Cycles**  
includes 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2016 cycles




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, Russell.

### Let's Get Smaller

There's no other way to paint it, small- and mid-cap stocks dramatically underperformed in 2023. Each of the following compounded at least some of the issues facing smaller US companies in 2023 – from the US banking woes and their perceived impact, to fears surrounding longer duration assets, to the general (and more common sense) move to liquidity (larger companies). However, despite the broader headwinds, small- and mid-cap stocks thanks in part to remarkable cash flow and operating performance weathered the storm in our view. As such, with earnings growth beginning to follow suit (especially in small-cap stocks) and valuation and performance displaying multi-year, if not all-time lows, we believe it is appropriate to add to small- and mid-cap stocks heading into 2024.


- Equalize small-, mid- and large-cap positions (most all-cap and core investors are excessively underweight small- and mid-cap in our view).
- Slight advantage to small-cap, given massive underperformance and potential stabilization of earnings growth relative to mid-cap.
- Focus on dividend growth and cash flow prowess for stability (especially Financials and select defensives) and bottom fish stable growth in secular growers (Comm Services, Discretionary, Technology and Health Care).

**Exhibit 39: SMID Appears Significantly Oversold**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 40: SMID Trades at Substantial Discounts**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 41: SMID EPS Growth Has Rebounded Sharply**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 42: SMID Has Improved Cash Flow**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

## 2024 Market Outlook – Canada

### The Return of “Tigger”

Several years ago, we began to refer to the Canadian stock market, economy, and investors as the literal equivalent to the mythical creature “Eeyore” from “Winnie the Poo”. An “Eeyore” extrapolates the negative conditions or rainy weather today to a stormy environment and fear of tomorrow. Welcome to the current Canadian climate heading into 2024. To be clear, we mean no disrespect when labeling the Canadian stock market and investors as Eeyore. To the contrary, we respect it and have continued to learn from it. After all, defense is usually the best offense. However there comes a time when common sense, reality, and yes, fundamentals lead us to a different conclusion relative to the consensus for 2024. Stating the obvious, Canadian investing trends in 2023 were dominated by macro data points (actual and potential – that have yet to transpire by the way), resulting in the S&P/TSX posting its worst performance versus the S&P 500 since 2015. Yes, this comes after strong outperformance relative to most other developed markets and its neighbor to the south in 2022. However, for our part, we believe the depth of underperformance underscores the paralyzing pessimism that traditionally persists in Canada relative to the increasingly clear fact that recent softness in domestic economic activity is more than priced in at current valuations. Furthermore, the economic “Armageddon” that most investors have been basing their investment decisions on for the past several months has not occurred and has once again been way overblown. Indeed, given the strong value position of the TSX relative to other global markets, we continue to believe Canada is well-positioned for an extended period of NORMALIZATION that we expect to unfold over the coming years. Furthermore, as growth begins to re-accelerate in the second half of 2024, we believe this pessimism will turn to optimism, driving a long-overdue valuation expansion into the end of the year. Overall, while our initial target was not reached in 2023, we believe the rebound we expected for the Canadian stock market was only just delayed as investors digested the impact of higher rates. As such, as the reality of a more resilient economy and rebounding earnings growth in the second half transpires, we believe the TSX can and will attain higher prices with a 2024 year-end price target of 23,500 on earnings of \$1,500. This represents just over a 16% return based on our current price and a multiple improvement to 15.7x from the current level below 14x – still well below the long-term average multiple of 17x. Yes, Canada is the contrarian call in 2024.

### Valuation Normalization With a Dose of Downside Protection

Yes, Canada offers asymmetric upside, in our opinion. As we have written about extensively, valuation normalization favors Canada longer term, a process that should also add downside protection during periods of heightened volatility. Firstly, TSX valuation is well below historical average multiples and trading near recession trough valuations, in our opinion. As such, as earnings confidence improves and overall growth transitions back toward more historical “normal” high-single digits, we believe TSX valuations will slowly normalize back toward historical averages (see Exhibits 43 and 44). Secondly, with a massive amount of pessimism priced in, Canadian equities will likely continue to see downside protection during bouts of heightened volatility (see Exhibit 45).


### Broadening US Performance = Stronger TSX

We believe the broadening out of equity performance should and will benefit Canadian equities heading into and in 2024. In fact, the concentration of US Equity performance in the mega-cap stocks has been a key defining characteristic of global equity performance so far in 2023. As such, we believe as US equity market performance broadens out heading in 2024, and investor confidence improves from the current dreadful levels, such trends will also benefit Canadian equity performance. In fact, the TSX has been highly correlated to the S&P 500 excluding these mega-cap names, suggesting to us that broadening US performance equals a stronger TSX (see Exhibit 46).

### US Will Remain the Key Driver of Growth


While there has been some clear economic divergence between Canada and the US, we believe Canadian investors should remain focused on the leading nature of US economic activity when looking at the broader growth trajectory of Canadian equity markets. Indeed, Canadian economic growth and earnings growth are highly correlated with the US, with only minor historical deviations (see Exhibit 47). As such, investors should stay focused on the improving US earnings growth outlook which will continue to drive performance over the longer term, in our opinion. Yes, "As America goes, so goes Canada".

**Exhibit 43: Valuation Spread Persists**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

**Exhibit 44: Canadian Value Is Broad-Based**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES

**Exhibit 45: TSX = Downside Protection for Second Year in a Row**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

**Exhibit 46: Broadening US Performance Will Benefit Canada**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES

**Exhibit 47: Ultimately, Canadian Growth Is Driven by US Growth**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

**Exhibit 48: US Earnings Growth Is Rebounding, Canada to Follow**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES



### S&P/TSX Price Target 23,500

From our perspective, 2023 has been a disappointing year for Canadian equities as the TSX has clearly struggled to keep pace with the S&P 500. However, despite this underperformance our work suggests a lot of negativities are already priced into Canadian equities. As such, the recovery we expected in 2023 has likely been delayed to 2024 when we believe investors will begin to see through the economic and interest rate rhetoric that has dominated this year. Overall, we believe the downside is likely to be more limited in Canada and the upside potential is far greater, particularly when investor confidence broadens out. Our base case assumes softer commodity prices, but a slowly improving growth profile into the end of 2024. We believe this will add support for further valuation improvement into the end of 2024, with the TSX reaching a new all-time high of 23,500. This represents just over a 16% annual return based current price and a multiple improvement to 15.7x from the current below 14x, and still well below the long-term average multiple of 17x. Additionally, we believe active investment strategies will remain a key pillar for 2024. In other words, investors will need to remain nimble throughout the year rotating in and out of areas to take advantage of what we think will be evolving market conditions particularly in the first half of the year.

### S&P/TSX EPS Target \$1,500

As expected, the TSX experienced a minor earnings contraction this year with S&P/TSX EPS declining around 6% in 2023. However, earnings expectations have already started to stabilize, with strong positive surprise in the third quarter and net positive revisions seen over the last few months. As such, we believe 2024 will see a mild earnings recovery, with the bulk of the recovery occurring in the second half of the year. Overall, we expect growth to normalize back to the mid- to low single-digit range by the end of the year and into 2025. This should be supportive of valuation expansion through 2024. We expect the twelve-month trailing P/E to expand to 15.7x by the end of 2024 from the current sub 14x LTM P/E. Yes, this remains firmly below the long-run average trailing P/E of 17x leaving significant room for further valuation expansion over the coming years.

#### Exhibit 49: 2024 S&P/TSX Composite Target Scenarios

Scenario	Price	EPS	Rationale
Bull	26,000	\$1,600	<p>US economy avoids recession, Canadian economy rebounds sooner than most think, inflation declines more rapidly than expected and longer-term interest rates slowly decline.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leads to better multiple expansion and normalization.</li> <li>Earnings surprise to the upside so TSX hits new all-time high.</li> </ul>
Base	23,500	\$1,500	<p>Slow economic growth to start the year with 2H economic recovery, rates stabilize, and inflation slowly returns to target. 10yr yield averages sub-4% and slowly declines throughout the year.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continued slow multiple expansion and normalization.</li> <li>Earnings Growth remains slow but improves in 2H so TSX hits new all-time high.</li> </ul>
Bear	17,000	\$1,200	<p>Hard landing; high interest rates impact employment and final demand. Unemployment starts to accelerate, risk off comes back in full force, recovery pushed to 2025 or further.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Multiples DO NOT expand (maybe even compress further)</li> <li>Earnings follow typical "recession" decline (-20-30%).</li> </ul>

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, Bloomberg.

**Exhibit 50: 2023 & 2024 S&P/TSX Targets**

**Price Target**

Model	Category	2023E	2024E
Dividend Discount Model	Fundamental	22,500	22,925
Fair Value Price-to-Earnings Model	Valuation	25,100	25,444
EPS Revision Model	Mean Reversion	20,025	23,100
Macroeconomic Regression Model	Macro	22,674	22,156
Expected Return*		4.4%	16.8%
Latest S&P/TSX Close		20,114	
<b>Price Target</b>		<b>21,000</b>	<b>23,500</b>

**Earnings Per Share Target**

Model	Category	2023E	2024E
Macroeconomic Regression Model	Macro	1,443	1,443
Mean Consensus Regression Model	Fundamental	1,450	1,502
Mean Consensus	Fundamental	1,432	1,588
Expected EPS Growth		-6.4%	3.4%
Prior Year S&P/TSX EPS**		\$1,552	1,450
<b>EPS Target</b>		<b>\$1,450</b>	<b>1,500</b>
<b>Implied P/E</b>		<b>14.1x</b>	<b>15.7x</b>

\*Based on 11/22/2023 closing price. \*\*Based on our prior year EPS target if EPS is not fully reported for index. Source: BMO Investment Strategy Group.


**Key Notes on Our Models and Underlying Assumptions**

Our models were built on BMO Economics outlook for GDP growth and interest rates, and consensus outlook for commodity prices. The models assume inflation trends back to target while interest rates stabilize but remain high, and commodity prices are soft through 2024. Given the front-loaded economic weakness in these forecasts and slightly negative commodity prices, our regression model is showing a more modest gain for the TSX. Meanwhile our fair value P/E model shows the potential upside for valuation reversion in 2024 if inflation and interests rates follow the consensus script. This model uses a regression of the relationship between long-term interest rates and inflation to derive a long-term fair value P/E. When we apply the 2024 consensus estimates for the US 10-year yield and inflation, and then apply that to our 2024 EPS estimate, the model implies a fair value target of above 25,000 for the TSX. Indeed, this model shows valuations reverting to near historical averages during the year if current consensus is achieved. Our Dividend Discount model remains are historically most accurate model and based on consensus assumptions is show a solid gain just shy of our target.

**Exhibit 51: Fair Value P/E Model Shows Sharp Reversion Based on 2024 Consensus Estimates**

**Fair Value LTM PE Model vs Actual LTM PE**

scenario = FV LTM PE model under consensus 2024 economic forecasts



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

## Sectors, Size, and Style Recommendations

### Canadian Sector Opinions

**Exhibit 52: Canadian Sector Opinion Summary**

Sector	Opinion	Index Weight	Target Weight	BMO Investment Strategy Group Headline
Communication Services	OW	3.9%	4.5%	Excessively oversold; challenges to pure yield remains elevated; largest YoY relative weighting loss in TSX.
Consumer Discretionary	OW	3.7%	4.5%	Contrarian play in the face of economic concerns; however, well managed companies + cyclical tail wind.
Consumer Staples	UW	4.5%	3.5%	Easing inflationary pressure in 2024 will likely be key headwind within an already expensive sector.
Energy	MW	18.3%	18.0%	Fundamentally sound = deep value, strong cash generation; possible oil price weakness provides resistance.
Financials	OW	30.2%	31.5%	Pessimism is at historic extremes; steadfastly maintaining holdings, especially with large US platforms.
Health Care	UW	0.3%	0%	Prefer U.S for diversification.
Industrials	UW	13.2%	12.0%	Expensive, earnings have struggled to meet expectations; focus on areas where growth is leveraged to US.
Information Technology	OW	8.5%	9.0%	Strong outperformance likely has room to run but sharpen selectivity.
Materials	MW	11.1%	11.0%	Global growth slowing and underlying commodities losing momentum in the face of dissipating inflation.
Real Estate	MW	2.3%	2.0%	Canadian Real Estate is less interest sensitive relative to other high yielding sectors, particularly since 2002.
Utilities	MW	4.0%	4.0%	Very oversold, multiples have come back to reality, focus on dividend growth over yield

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group. Key: OW: Overweight, MW: Market Weight, UW: Underweight

**Exhibit 53: S&P/TSX Annual Sector Performance**

Year	COMSV	COND	CONS	ENRS	FINL	HLTH	INDU	INFT	MATR	RELS	UTIL	S&P/TSX
1990	-12.6%	-25.1%	-11.4%	-10.5%	-21.7%	-21.3%	-24.3%	2.8%	-19.3%		-2.4%	-18.0%
1991	21.5%	14.0%	21.4%	-19.0%	21.1%	61.5%	-10.5%	55.9%	-3.6%		1.3%	7.8%
1992	-11.2%	-1.2%	0.9%	3.5%	-11.9%	-14.2%	-11.1%	20.0%	-1.5%		-4.4%	-4.6%
1993	16.4%	21.0%	4.0%	33.1%	27.8%	5.6%	27.6%	18.6%	56.8%		19.1%	29.0%
1994	-1.8%	-11.6%	-1.8%	-7.1%	-6.1%	13.4%	3.0%	-7.2%	4.1%		-9.6%	-2.5%
1995	2.7%	0.6%	19.4%	15.2%	14.1%	62.3%	13.7%	34.0%	7.6%		6.3%	11.9%
1996	30.9%	25.4%	15.2%	36.8%	49.9%	30.1%	30.4%	21.7%	9.7%		22.4%	25.7%
1997	39.2%	28.4%	16.2%	3.1%	49.8%	-11.1%	19.2%	40.1%	-26.2%		38.2%	13.0%
1998	21.1%	6.7%	23.6%	-30.4%	0.6%	-0.3%	-11.2%	7.6%	-12.3%		-4.0%	-3.2%
1999	85.0%	-0.5%	13.3%	26.2%	-13.0%	13.1%	4.1%	188.8%	12.4%		-30.6%	29.7%
2000	22.5%	9.5%	38.1%	46.3%	45.6%	3.8%	28.2%	-31.1%	-8.9%		42.6%	6.2%
2001	-29.6%	1.7%	27.4%	6.1%	1.3%	15.2%	5.5%	-62.1%	8.9%		6.4%	-13.9%
2002	-21.9%	-21.3%	0.9%	12.7%	-5.0%	-42.8%	-31.3%	-64.8%	5.5%		2.1%	-14.0%
2003	12.6%	19.5%	18.9%	23.6%	24.4%	1.3%	21.1%	67.0%	26.0%		19.9%	24.3%
2004	8.2%	8.3%	9.3%	28.7%	16.5%	-17.4%	0.2%	11.5%	5.7%	11.2%	5.0%	12.5%
2005	9.7%	8.6%	-2.2%	61.3%	20.5%	-3.5%	16.5%	-15.8%	13.9%	20.0%	33.1%	21.9%
2006	16.4%	13.2%	3.9%	3.2%	15.9%	-0.7%	12.7%	27.3%	38.0%	23.5%	2.1%	14.5%
2007	16.2%	1.8%	-6.8%	5.0%	-4.6%	-27.1%	8.6%	48.1%	29.1%	-11.6%	6.9%	7.2%
2008	-27.4%	-37.5%	-7.8%	-36.3%	-39.0%	-34.4%	-26.9%	-54.3%	-27.1%	-45.2%	-24.0%	-35.0%
2009	0.7%	11.1%	6.1%	35.0%	38.3%	28.6%	23.7%	44.3%	33.4%	35.0%	12.7%	30.7%
2010	16.2%	21.8%	8.3%	10.0%	6.3%	50.3%	14.4%	-11.6%	35.8%	26.4%	12.6%	14.4%
2011	19.0%	-17.9%	4.8%	-12.3%	-6.6%	49.6%	2.0%	-52.6%	-21.8%	1.1%	1.6%	-11.1%
2012	6.4%	18.7%	20.4%	-3.6%	12.8%	24.1%	12.7%	-3.2%	-6.9%	16.2%	-0.8%	4.0%
2013	8.1%	39.5%	21.4%	9.9%	19.1%	71.7%	34.9%	36.2%	-30.6%	0.5%	-8.6%	9.6%
2014	10.5%	26.4%	46.9%	-7.8%	9.8%	30.2%	20.0%	34.0%	-4.5%	18.0%	11.3%	7.4%
2015	-1.0%	-3.5%	11.0%	-25.7%	-5.5%	-15.8%	-12.5%	14.8%	-22.8%	3.1%	-7.8%	-11.1%
2016	9.9%	8.2%	6.1%	31.2%	19.3%	-78.6%	20.7%	4.4%	39.0%	4.1%	12.7%	17.5%
2017	9.9%	20.4%	6.4%	-10.0%	9.4%	32.7%	17.9%	16.2%	6.3%	5.8%	6.2%	6.0%
2018	-5.3%	-17.7%	0.6%	-21.5%	-12.6%	-16.6%	-3.9%	12.5%	-10.6%	-2.8%	-13.4%	-11.6%
2019	8.2%	13.1%	12.8%	16.2%	16.9%	-11.4%	23.6%	63.5%	22.1%	17.4%	31.6%	19.1%
2020	-8.3%	14.4%	2.8%	-30.8%	-2.9%	-23.6%	15.3%	80.3%	19.5%	-13.0%	10.6%	2.2%
2021	19.1%	16.3%	20.6%	41.8%	31.6%	-20.1%	15.1%	18.3%	2.3%	33.1%	7.5%	21.7%
2022	-7.0%	-8.1%	8.5%	24.4%	-12.7%	-62.2%	0.2%	-52.2%	-0.2%	-24.3%	-14.0%	-8.7%
2023	-8.7%	6.0%	11.7%	3.7%	0.1%	2.1%	3.7%	61.3%	-6.2%	-5.0%	-7.3%	3.8%

REITs are used as a historical proxy for the Real Estate sector which was officially established in Sept. 2016.

Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group. Performance calculated through 11/22/23.

## Canadian Sectors

### Overview = Own the Winners (Tech for Growth) and Be Contrarian (Financials and Communication Services for Value and Consumer Discretionary for Cyclical Rotation)


Akin to the US, Canadian sector investing should be equated to everything in moderation, with a bit more of a contrarian twist. While a broadening out of equity performance should benefit Canadian equities, the results will likely be sector agnostic for the most part. As such, we are employing only modest Overweight and Underweight stances heading into 2024 as we believe sector calls will be become less important relative to bottoms-up stock picking. Furthermore, the “normalization” process that we expect to transpire in 2024 will favor more value-oriented sectors like Financials (everyone’s favorite sector to hate, blame, and pillage). We believe such emotional and consensus-driven decision-making is way overdone, with sentiment reaching extreme levels of pessimism that the market has not experienced in decades. From our lens, Canadian Banks in particular (especially those with well-established and thriving US platforms) remain excellent stewards of capital. As such, Financials remain our largest Overweight. However, there is no denying that most institutional and global investors are very underexposed and have been overemphasizing the negative “what-ifs” – including, but not limited to credit blowing up, real estate melting down, expansive loan losses, and unmanageable consumer debt. All these concerns have been well telegraphed and well-managed by companies in our opinion. Therefore, we continue to believe the sector is well-positioned and is poised to outperform and thrive during the normalization process. For growth investors in Canada, the strength in Technology is likely to proceed – especially given the broadening out of overall North American equities. Furthermore, we believe Canadian Technology is becoming increasingly correlated to small- and mid-sized public and private companies in the US especially, thereby providing an additional tailwind. As such, we are maintaining our Overweight stance on Technology for 2024, but caution investors to focus on bottoms-up stock picking relative to making broader sector decisions.

### Sector Changes

- **Upgrading Consumer Discretionary to Overweight From Market Weight**

- ✓ While the Canadian consumer has certainly struggled and will likely continue to face challenges given the current state of elevated interest rates compared to the last three years, we believe much of these concerns are already “priced in.” As such, we believe the Consumer Discretionary sector is positioned to be a strong contrarian play, as our work shows that the sector typically exhibits its best performance during the early stages of an economic recovery. In fact, the sector traditionally troughs with respect to both price performance and earnings growth in the midst of economic weakness... NOT after.
- ✓ In addition, given Discretionary’s relatively small weight in the TSX (one that includes a strong breadth of well managed companies), we believe the sector is ripe for stock pickers to find both value and growth.

**Exhibit 54: Troughing Economic Activity Typically Marks the Trough in Earnings Growth and Performance**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

- **Upgrading Utilities to Market Weight From Underweight**


- ✓ Admittedly we have been reluctant to favor Utilities for most of our career. Our reasoning has mostly been defined by our concerns regarding the sector’s traditional premium, if not downright expensive valuation metrics, and lack of organic growth that have been commonplace for Utilities for most of the past 20 years.
- ✓ However, thanks to one of the sharpest pullbacks in price and valuation in decades, Utilities are no longer expensive according to our models. Furthermore, the sector is likely to benefit from stabilizing, if not likely compressing bond yields in 2024.

**Exhibit 55: Valuations Have Collapsed to Decade Lows**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

**Exhibit 56: Utilities Can Be Flat in Flat Interest Rate Environment**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

- **Downgrading Materials to Market Weight From Overweight**


- ✓ Materials displayed disappointing performance in 2023, especially considering above average inflation and rising underlying commodity costs across most sub industries. As such, this does not bode well for the sector in 2024, especially as consensus forecasts are for lower inflation, decelerating underlying commodity prices and slower global growth.
- ✓ Remain focused on paper/forest products and gold in Materials.

**Exhibit 57: Choppy Commodities = Choppy Price Performance**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

**Exhibit 58: Cash Flow and Distributions Have Eased Sharply From Record Levels**




Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

- **Downgrading Industrials to Underweight From Market Weight**


- ✓ To be clear, this is just mild underweight as we believe a broadening of performance requires more active stock selection. With that said, Industrials is one of the most expensive sectors in the TSX, thereby limiting any potential valuation expansion, especially in the face of decelerating earnings growth through 2024.
- ✓ Focus on rails, waste, and other select areas where much of their growth comes from the US.

**Exhibit 59: Industrials Remains One of the Most Expensive Sectors in the TSX, as Such Likely to See Continued Multiple Compression**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

**Exhibit 60: Earnings Growth Continues to Slow From Elevated Levels**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES.

### Canadian Size Opinions

**Exhibit 61: Canadian Size Opinions**


Sector	Opinion	Comments
Large cap	MW	Large cap is trading at a deep discount to history, while earnings and profitability are likely to trough in the early part of 2024. Canadian Large Cap is well-positioned for the broad Normalization process but remain highly selective.
Small cap	MW	Small Cap is value within a value market, additional earnings growth and profitability have trough before their large cap peers. Canadian Small Cap is well-positioned for the broad Normalization process but remain highly selective.

Key: OW: Overweight, MW: Market Weight, UW: Underweight; Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group.

**Bottom Line:** With Canada being the clear contrarian trade, an improving outlook and multiple expansion should be a tailwind for both Large Cap and Small Cap equities. Overall, Canadian small cap is value within a value market, suggesting there are plenty of contrarian opportunities in the small-cap universe, particularly outside the resource sectors. Yes, choppy commodities suggest investors should lean larger cap in these sectors, but selectivity remains key. Especially given the large cash positions of the large-cap Energy and Materials companies, which in our opinion leaves room for a significant acquisition cycle in 2024 and into 2025.

**Exhibit 62: Canada Is Broadly a Deep Value Market**

**Valuation Composite: Small Caps and Large Caps**  
average z-score of LTM P/E, NTM P/E, P/B/ and P/S



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 63: Small Cap Growth Is Already Rebounding**


**LTM Median EPS Growth: Small Caps vs Large Caps**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES

**Exhibit 64: Small Cap Profitability May Have Troughed**


**ROE: Small Caps vs Large Caps**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet.

**Exhibit 65: Cash Generation Is Stronger in Large Cap**

**Free Cash Flow Yield: Small Caps vs Large Caps**



Source: BMO Capital Markets Investment Strategy Group, FactSet, IBES

## **Implementations Strategies**

### **US Portfolio Strategy**

[US Tactical](#)

[US Large Cap Disciplined Value](#)

[US Dividend Growth](#)

[US SMID Cap](#)

[US All Cap](#)

[US Multi-Factor Growth and Value ETFs](#)

### **Canadian Portfolio Strategy**

[Canadian Ex-MEF \(Anything but the Big Three\)](#)

[Canadian Small Cap](#)

[Canadian GARP](#)

### **North American Portfolio Strategy**

[Canadian Equity Plus](#)

[US Equity Plus](#)

[North American Dividend Growth](#)



## IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

### Analyst's Certification

We, Brian G. Belski, Nicholas Rocanova and Ryan Bohren, hereby certify that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect our personal views about the subject securities or issuers. We also certify that no part of our compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

Analysts who prepared this report are compensated based upon (among other factors) the overall profitability of BMO Capital Markets and their affiliates, which includes the overall profitability of investment banking services. Compensation for research is based on effectiveness in generating new ideas and in communication of ideas to clients, performance of recommendations, accuracy of earnings estimates, and service to clients.

Analysts employed by BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and/or BMO Capital Markets Limited are not registered as research analysts with FINRA. These analysts may not be associated persons of BMO Capital Markets Corp. and therefore may not be subject to the FINRA Rule 2241 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

### Distribution of Ratings (November 26, 2023)

Rating category	BMO rating	BMOCM US Universe*	BMOCM US IB Clients**	BMOCM US IB Clients***	BMOCM Universe****	BMOCM IB Clients*****	StarMine Universe~
Buy	Outperform	48.0 %	15.7 %	46.0 %	54.2 %	57.7 %	57.7%
Hold	Market Perform	49.3 %	16.7 %	50.0 %	44.3 %	40.7 %	37.5%
Sell	Underperform	2.4 %	18.2 %	2.7 %	1.4 %	1.0 %	4.8%

\* Reflects rating distribution of all companies covered by BMO Capital Markets Corp. equity research analysts.

\*\* Reflects rating distribution of all companies from which BMO Capital Markets Corp. has received compensation for Investment Banking services as percentage within ratings category.

\*\*\* Reflects rating distribution of all companies from which BMO Capital Markets Corp. has received compensation for Investment Banking services as percentage of Investment Banking clients.

\*\*\*\* Reflects rating distribution of all companies covered by BMO Capital Markets equity research analysts.

\*\*\*\*\* Reflects rating distribution of all companies from which BMO Capital Markets has received compensation for Investment Banking services as percentage of Investment Banking clients.

~ As of April 1, 2019.

### Ratings Key (as of October 2016)

We use the following ratings system definitions:

OP = Outperform - Forecast to outperform the analyst's coverage universe on a total return basis;

Mkt = Market Perform - Forecast to perform roughly in line with the analyst's coverage universe on a total return basis;

Und = Underperform - Forecast to underperform the analyst's coverage universe on a total return basis;

(S) = Speculative investment;

Spd = Suspended - Coverage and rating suspended until coverage is reinstated;

NR = No Rated - No rating at this time; and

R = Restricted - Dissemination of research is currently restricted.

The total return potential, target price and the associated time horizon is 12 months unless otherwise stated in each report. BMO Capital Markets' seven Top 15 lists guide investors to our best ideas according to different objectives (CDN Large Cap, CDN Small Cap, US Large Cap, US Small Cap, Income, CDN Quant, and US Quant have replaced the Top Pick rating).

### Prior BMO Capital Markets Rating System

#### (April 2013 - October 2016)

[http://researchglobal.bmocapitalmarkets.com/documents/2013/rating\\_key\\_2013\\_to\\_2016.pdf](http://researchglobal.bmocapitalmarkets.com/documents/2013/rating_key_2013_to_2016.pdf)

#### (January 2010 - April 2013)

[http://researchglobal.bmocapitalmarkets.com/documents/2013/prior\\_rating\\_system.pdf](http://researchglobal.bmocapitalmarkets.com/documents/2013/prior_rating_system.pdf)

### Other Important Disclosures

For Important Disclosures on the stocks discussed in this report, please go to <https://researchglobal0.bmocapitalmarkets.com/public-disclosure/> or write to Editorial Department, BMO Capital Markets, 151 West 42nd St, 33rd Floor, New York, NY 10036 or Editorial Department, BMO Capital Markets, 1 First Canadian Place, Toronto, Ontario, M5X 1H3.

### Dissemination of Research

Dissemination of fundamental BMO Capital Markets Equity Research is available via our website <https://researchglobal0.bmocapitalmarkets.com/>. Institutional clients may also simultaneously receive our fundamental research via email and/or via services such as Refinitiv, Bloomberg, FactSet, Visible Alpha, and S&P Capital IQ.

BMO Capital Markets issues a variety of research products in addition to fundamental research. Institutional clients may request notification when additional research content is made available on our website. BMO Capital Markets may use proprietary models in the preparation of reports. Material information about such models may be obtained by contacting the research analyst directly. There is no planned frequency of model updates.

The analyst(s) named in this report may discuss trading strategies that reference a catalyst or event that may have a near or long term impact on the market price of the equity securities discussed. In some cases, the impact may directionally counter the analyst's published 12 month target price and rating. Any such trading or alternative strategies can be based on differing time horizons, methodologies, or otherwise and are distinct from and do not affect the analysts' fundamental equity rating in the report.

Research coverage of licensed cannabis producers and other cannabis-related companies is made available only to eligible approved North American, Australian, and EU-based BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., BMO Capital Markets Limited, Bank of Montreal Europe Plc and BMO Capital Markets Corp. clients via email, our website and select third party platforms.

~ Research distribution and approval times are provided on the cover of each report. Times are approximations as system and distribution processes are not exact and can vary based on the sender and recipients' services. Unless otherwise noted, times are Eastern Standard and when two times are provided, the approval time precedes the distribution time.

For recommendations disseminated during the preceding 12-month period, please visit: <https://researchglobal0.bmocapitalmarkets.com/public-disclosure/>.

### **General Disclaimer**

"BMO Capital Markets" is a trade name used by BMO Financial Group for the wholesale banking businesses of Bank of Montreal, BMO Bank N.A. (member FDIC), Bank of Montreal Europe p.l.c, and Bank of Montreal (China) Co. Ltd, the institutional broker dealer business of BMO Capital Markets Corp. (Member [FINRA](#) and [SIPC](#)) and the agency broker dealer business of Clearpool Execution Services, LLC (Member [FINRA](#) and [SIPC](#)) in the U.S., and the institutional broker dealer businesses of BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. (Member Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and Member Canadian Investor Protection Fund) in Canada and Asia, Bank of Montreal Europe p.l.c. (authorised and regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland) in Europe and BMO Capital Markets Limited (authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority) in the UK and Australia. Bank of Montreal or its subsidiaries ("BMO Financial Group") has lending arrangements with, or provide other remunerated services to, many issuers covered by BMO Capital Markets. The opinions, estimates and projections contained in this report are those of BMO Capital Markets as of the date of this report and are subject to change without notice. BMO Capital Markets endeavours to ensure that the contents have been compiled or derived from sources that we believe are reliable and contain information and opinions that are accurate and complete. However, BMO Capital Markets makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, in respect thereof, takes no responsibility for any errors and omissions contained herein and accepts no liability whatsoever for any loss arising from any use of, or reliance on, this report or its contents. Information may be available to BMO Capital Markets or its affiliates that is not reflected in this report. The information in this report is not intended to be used as the primary basis of investment decisions, and because of individual client objectives, should not be construed as advice designed to meet the particular investment needs of any investor. The information in this report is based on general considerations and do not purport to meet the objectives or needs of specific recipients. Nothing herein constitutes any investment, legal, tax or other advice nor is it to be relied on in any investment or decision. If you are in doubt about any of the contents of this document, the reader should obtain independent professional advice. This material is for information purposes only and is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security. In furnishing this report, BMO Capital Markets intends to take advantage of the exemption from the principal and agency trading restrictions in Section 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rule 206(3)-1 thereunder. Accordingly, recipients of this report are advised that BMO Capital Markets or its affiliates may act as principal for its own account or agent for another person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security mentioned in or the subject of this report. BMO Capital Markets or its affiliates, officers, directors or employees have a long or short position in many of the securities discussed herein, related securities or in options, futures or other derivative instruments based thereon. The reader should assume that BMO Capital Markets or its affiliates may have a conflict of interest and should not rely solely on this report in evaluating whether or not to buy or sell securities of issuers discussed herein.

### **Additional Matters**

This report is directed only at entities or persons in jurisdictions or countries where access to and use of the information is not contrary to local laws or regulations. Its contents have not been reviewed by any regulatory authority. BMO Capital Markets does not represent that this report may be lawfully distributed or that any financial products may be lawfully offered or dealt with, in compliance with regulatory requirements in other jurisdictions, or pursuant to an exemption available thereunder.

To Australian residents: BMO Capital Markets Limited and Bank of Montreal are exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence under the Corporations Act in respect of financial services they provide to wholesale investors (as defined in the Corporations Act). BMO Capital Markets Limited is regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority under UK laws, and Bank of Montreal in Hong Kong is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission, which differ from Australia laws. This document is only intended for wholesale clients (as defined in the Corporations Act 2001), Eligible Counterparties or Professional Clients (as defined in Annex II to MiFID II) and Professional Investors (as defined in the Securities and Futures Ordinance and the Securities and Futures (Professional Investor) Rules under the Securities and Futures Ordinance of Hong Kong).

To Canadian Residents: BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. furnishes this report to Canadian residents and accepts responsibility for the contents herein subject to the terms set out above. Any Canadian person wishing to effect transactions in any of the securities included in this report should do so through BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc.

The following applies if this research was prepared in whole or in part by Colin Hamilton, Alexander Pearce or Raj Ray:

This research is not prepared subject to Canadian disclosure requirements. This research is prepared by BMO Capital Markets Limited and distributed by BMO Capital Markets Limited or Bank of Montreal Europe Plc and is subject to the regulations of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom and the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) in Ireland. FCA and CBI regulations require that a firm providing research disclose its ownership interest in the issuer that is the subject of the research if it and its affiliates own 5% or more of the equity of the issuer. Canadian regulations require that a firm providing research disclose its ownership interest in the issuer that is the subject of the research if it and its affiliates own 1% or more of the equity of the issuer that is the subject of the research. Therefore each of BMO Capital Markets Limited and Bank of Montreal Europe Plc will disclose its and its affiliates' ownership interest in the subject issuer only if such ownership exceeds 5% of the equity of the issuer.

To E.U. Residents: In an E.U. Member State this document is issued and distributed by Bank of Montreal Europe plc which is authorised and regulated in Ireland and operates in the E.U. on a passported basis. This document is only intended for Eligible Counterparties or Professional Clients, as defined in Annex II to "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive" 2014/65/EU ("MiFID II").

To U.S. Residents: BMO Capital Markets Corp. furnishes this report to U.S. residents and accepts responsibility for the contents herein, except to the extent that it refers to securities of Bank of Montreal. Any U.S. person wishing to effect transactions in any security discussed herein should do so through BMO Capital Markets Corp.

To U.K. Residents: In the UK this document is published by BMO Capital Markets Limited which is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. The contents hereof are intended solely for the use of, and may only be issued or passed on to, (I) persons who have professional experience in matters relating to investments falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the "Order") or (II) high net worth entities falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order (all such persons together referred to as "relevant persons"). The contents hereof are not intended for the use of and may not be issued or passed on to retail clients.

To Hong Kong Residents: In Hong Kong, this report is published and distributed by Bank of Montreal. Bank of Montreal (incorporated in Canada with limited liability) is an authorized institution under the Banking Ordinance and a registered institution with the Securities and Futures Commission (CE No. AAK809) to carry on Type 1 (dealing in securities) and Type 4 (advising in securities) regulated activities under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong). This report has not been reviewed or approved by any regulatory authority in Hong Kong. Accordingly this report must not be issued, circulated or distributed in Hong Kong other than (a) to professional investors as defined in the Securities and Futures Ordinance and the Securities and Futures (Professional Investor) Rules under the Securities and Futures Ordinance of Hong Kong, or (b) in circumstances which do not result in or constitute an offer to the public in Hong Kong.

To Korean Residents: This report has been provided to you without charge for your convenience only. All information contained in this report is factual information and does not reflect any opinion or judgement of BMO Capital Markets. The information contained in this report should not be construed as offer, marketing, solicitation or investment advice with respect to financial investment products in this report.

To Japan Residents: This report has not been reviewed by any regulatory authority in Japan. This report is provided for information purposes only and it should not be construed as an offer to sell, a solicitation to buy, or a recommendation for any security, or as an offer to provide investment management or advisory or other services in Japan. Securities may not be offered or sold in Japan by means of this report or any other document other than to Qualified Financial Institutions within the meaning of item (i) of Article 17-3 of the Government Ordinance to enforce the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (Kinyu Shohin Torihiki Ho Sekou Rei). Unless specified otherwise, the securities that may be offered to you are not and will not be registered in Japan pursuant to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Acts.

To Taiwanese Residents: This report is not intended to constitute investment advice nor a public offer for any investment products to investors in Taiwan. This report should only be accessed by investors in Taiwan that are qualified to invest in investment products pursuant to relevant Taiwanese laws and regulations, and subject to sales restrictions as set forth in the relevant Taiwanese laws and regulations. BMO Capital Markets has not and will not secure the required licenses in Taiwan for the offer of securities and investment services. Any offer of securities has not been and will not be registered or filed with or approved by the Financial Commission of Taiwan and/or other regulatory authority pursuant to relevant securities laws and regulations of Taiwan, and may not be issued, offered or sold within Taiwan through a public offering or in circumstances which constitute an offer that requires a registration, filing or approval of the Financial Supervisory Commission of Taiwan and/or other regulatory authority in Taiwan under relevant securities laws and regulations of Taiwan. No person or entity in Taiwan has been authorized to offer or sell the securities in Taiwan.

To Singapore Residents: This report is intended for general circulation and does not and is not intended to constitute the provision of financial advisory services, whether directly or indirectly, to persons in Singapore. You should seek advice from a financial adviser regarding the suitability of the investment products, taking into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs before you make a commitment to purchase the investment product. This report has not been registered as a prospectus with the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Accordingly, it should not be circulated or distributed, nor may the securities described herein be offered or sold, or be made the subject of an invitation for subscription or purchase, whether directly or indirectly, to persons in Singapore other than (a) to an institutional investor or a relevant person as defined in and pursuant to and in accordance with the conditions of the relevant provisions of the Securities and Futures Act of Singapore or (b) otherwise pursuant to and in accordance with the conditions of, any other applicable provision of the SFA.

To Israeli residents: BMO Capital Markets is not licensed under the Israeli Law for the Regulation of Investment Advice, Investment Marketing and Portfolio Management of 1995 (the "Advice Law") nor does it carry insurance as required thereunder. This document is to be distributed

solely to persons that are qualified clients (as defined under the Advice Law) and qualified investors under the Israeli Securities Law of 1968. This document represents the analysis of the analyst but there is no assurance that any assumption or estimation will materialize.

These documents are provided to you on the express understanding that they must be held in complete confidence and not republished, retransmitted, distributed, disclosed, or otherwise made available, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, in hard or soft copy, through any means, to any person, except with the prior written consent of BMO Capital Markets.

[Click here](#) for data vendor disclosures when referenced within a BMO Capital Markets research document.

For assistance with accessible formats of online content, please contact [research@bmo.com](mailto:research@bmo.com).

The recommendation contained in this report was produced at November 23, 2023, 15:31 ET. and disseminated at November 23, 2023, 15:31 ET.

---

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST**

BMO Financial Group (NYSE, TSX: BMO) is an integrated financial services provider offering a range of retail banking, wealth management, and investment and corporate banking products. BMO serves Canadian retail clients through BMO Bank of Montreal and BMO Nesbitt Burns. In the United States, personal and commercial banking clients are served by BMO Bank N.A., (Member FDIC). Investment and corporate banking services are provided in Canada and the US through BMO Capital Markets.

BMO Capital Markets is a trade name used by BMO Financial Group for the wholesale banking businesses of Bank of Montreal, BMO Bank N.A. (member FDIC), Bank of Montreal Europe p.l.c. and Bank of Montreal (China) Co. Ltd, the institutional broker dealer business of BMO Capital Markets Corp. (Member [FINRA](#) and [SIPC](#)) and the agency broker dealer business of Clearpool Execution Services, LLC (Member [FINRA](#) and [SIPC](#)) in the U.S., and the institutional broker dealer businesses of BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. (Member Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and Member Canadian Investor Protection Fund) in Canada and Asia, Bank of Montreal Europe p.l.c. (authorised and regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland) in Europe and BMO Capital Markets Limited (authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority) in the UK and Australia.

"Nesbitt Burns" is a registered trademark of BMO Nesbitt Burns Corporation Limited, used under license. "BMO Capital Markets" is a trademark of Bank of Montreal, used under license. "BMO (M-Bar roundel symbol)" is a registered trademark of Bank of Montreal, used under license.

® Registered trademark of Bank of Montreal in the United States, Canada and elsewhere.

TM Trademark Bank of Montreal

©COPYRIGHT 2023 BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP.

A member of **BMO**  **Financial Group**

<b>Director of Research – US</b> Penn Egbert	929-599-7583	<b>Director of Research – Canada/UK</b> Camilla Sutton, CFA	437-332-2248		
<b>Diversity &amp; Talent Strategy</b> Alison Gilbert	416-618-8293	<b>Chief Operating Officer</b> Monica Shin	416-359-4894	<b>Managing Editor</b> Daniel O’Keefe	347-979-6165

## ENERGY

<b>Oil &amp; Gas – Integrated</b>	
Randy Ollenberger	403-515-1502
Phillip Jungwirth, CFA	303-436-1127
<b>Oil &amp; Gas – E&amp;P</b>	
Phillip Jungwirth, CFA	303-436-1127
Mike Murphy, P.Geol.	403-515-1540
<b>Oil &amp; Gas – Services</b>	
Phillip Jungwirth, CFA	303-436-1127
John Gibson, CFA	403-515-1527
<b>Oil &amp; Gas – Market Specialist</b>	
Jared Dziuba, CFA	403-515-3672
<b>Transition Energy</b>	
Ameet Thakkar	713-546-9741
<b>Carbon Innovation</b>	
Rachel Walsh, CFA	403-515-1517

## MATERIALS

<b>Commodity Strategy</b>	
Colin Hamilton	+44 (0)20 7664 8172
<b>Base Metals &amp; Mining</b>	
Rene Cartier, CPA, CA, CBV, CFA	416-359-5011
Katja Jancic, CFA	212-883-5109
Alexander Pearce	+44 (0)20 7246 5435
Jackie Przybylowski, P.Eng., CFA	416-359-6388
<b>Precious Metals &amp; Minerals</b>	
Andrew Mikitchook, P.Eng., CFA	416-359-5782
Kevin O’Halloran	416-278-7023
Brian Quast, P.Eng., JD	416-359-6824
Raj Ray, CFA, B.Eng.	+44 (0)20 7246 5430
<b>Fertilizers &amp; Chemicals</b>	
Joel Jackson, P.Eng., CFA	416-359-4250
<b>US Chemicals</b>	
John McNulty, CFA	212-885-4031
<b>Building Products</b>	
Ketan Mamtora	212-883-5121

## INDUSTRIALS

<b>Transportation &amp; Aerospace</b>	
Fadi Chamoun, CFA	416-359-6775
<b>Diversified Industrials</b>	
Devin Dodge, CFA	416-359-6774
John Gibson, CFA	403-515-1527
<b>Business Services and Education</b>	
Jeffrey M. Silber	917-239-4910
<b>Environmental Services</b>	
Devin Dodge, CFA	416-359-6774

## CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY

<b>Retailing/Consumer</b>	
Tamy Chen, CFA	416-359-5501
<b>Retail &amp; Services</b>	
Simeon Siegel, CFA	212-885-4077
<b>Cannabis</b>	
Tamy Chen, CFA	416-359-5501
<b>Restaurants, Beverages, Agribusiness &amp; Protein</b>	
Andrew Strelzik	212-885-4015
<b>Leisure</b>	
Tristan M. Thomas-Martin	212-885-4106
<b>Automotive</b>	
Tamy Chen, CFA	416-359-5501
<b>Education</b>	
Jeffrey M. Silber	917-239-4910
<b>Special Situations</b>	
Stephen MacLeod, CFA	416-359-8069

## CONSUMER STAPLES

<b>Food Retail</b>	
Kelly Bania	212-885-4162

## HEALTHCARE

<b>BioPharma</b>	
Evan David Seigerman	212-444-4328
<b>Biotechnology</b>	
Evan David Seigerman	212-444-4328
Etzer Darout, Ph.D.	617-960-2363
Kostas Biliouris, Ph.D.	347-504-4987

## FINANCIALS

<b>Canadian Banks &amp; Asset Managers</b>	
Sohrab Movahedi	416-359-7157
<b>US Financial Services</b>	
James Fotheringham	212-885-4180
<b>US Asset Managers</b>	
Rufus Hone, CFA	416-359-8304
<b>Insurance (US)</b>	
Michael Zaremski	646-873-5043
<b>Insurance/Asset Mgrs/Div Financials (Canada)</b>	
Tom MacKinnon, FSA, FCIA	416-359-4629
<b>Diversified Financials &amp; Asset Managers</b>	
Étienne Ricard, CFA	416-359-5296

## REAL ESTATE

<b>REITs (Canada)</b>	
Michael Markidis, CFA	416-917-5035
<b>REITs (US)</b>	
John P. Kim	212-885-4115
Juan C. Sanabria	312-845-4074
Ari Klein	212-885-4103

## INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

<b>IT Services &amp; Software</b>	
Keith Bachman, CFA	212-885-4010
<b>Software</b>	
Daniel Jester	415-354-7520
<b>Technology</b>	
Thanos Moschopoulos, CFA	416-359-5428
<b>Semiconductors</b>	
Ambrish Srivastava, Ph.D.	415-591-2116
<b>Telecom/Media/Cable</b>	
Tim Casey, CFA	416-359-4860

## UTILITIES

<b>Electric Utilities &amp; Independent Power</b>	
Ben Pham, CFA	416-359-4061
<b>Utilities, Power &amp; Renewables</b>	
James M. Thalacker	212-885-4007

## MACRO

<b>Investment Strategy</b>	
Brian G. Belski	212-885-4151 416-359-5761
<b>Canadian Equity Strategy</b>	
Ryan Bohren, CFA	416-359-4993
<b>US Equity Strategy</b>	
Nicholas Roccanova, CFA	212-885-4179
<b>ESG Strategy</b>	
Doug A. Morrow	416-359-5463
<b>Economics</b>	
Douglas Porter, CFA	416-359-4887
Michael Gregory, CFA	312-845-5025 416-359-4747
<b>Quantitative/Technical</b>	
David Cheng	416-359-7383
<b>Exchange Traded Funds</b>	
David Cheng	416-359-7383